[74] However, not every derogatory statement is defamatory. The test again is whether the impugned words genuinely threaten the plaintiff’s actual reputation (Weaver, at para. 68). Here, I am not satisfied that the impugned words of the Article reach that level. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons.
[75] First, as discussed above, the Article is poorly written and does not advance credible arguments in favour of Dr. Ball’s theory about the corruption of climate science. Simply put, a reasonably thoughtful and informed person who reads the Article is unlikely to place any stock in Dr. Ball’s views, including his views of Dr. Weaver as a supporter of conventional climate science. In Vellacott v. Saskatoon Star Phoenix Group Inc. et al, 2012 SKQB 359 [Vellacott], the court found that certain published comments were not defamatory because they were so ludicrous and outrageous as to be unbelievable and therefore incapable of lowering the reputation of the plaintiff in the minds of right-thinking persons (at para. 70). While the impugned words here are not as hyperbolic as the words in Vellacott, they similarly lack a sufficient air of credibility to make them believable and therefore potentially defamatory.
[76] Moreover, as noted above, the Article is clearly an opinion piece, and statements of opinion are generally evaluated differently than statements of fact. As stated by Mr. Justice Lebel in WIC Radio, at para. 71 of his concurring reasons:
[71] Although distinguishing facts from comment may sometimes be difficult, a comment is by its subjective nature generally less capable of damaging someone’s reputation than an objective statement of fact, because the public is much more likely to be influenced in its belief by a statement of fact than by a comment. …
[77] In my view, it is very unlikely that the Article and the opinions expressed therein had an impact on the views of anyone who read it, including their views, if any, of Dr. Weaver as a climate scientist. Rather, the reasonably thoughtful and informed reader would have recognized the Article as simply presenting one side of a highly charged public debate.
[78] Second, despite professing to have been “saddened, sickened and dismayed” by the Article, I am not satisfied that Dr. Weaver himself perceived the Article as genuinely threatening his actual reputation. As noted, Dr. Weaver has been actively and publically engaged in the climate change discussion for many years. That included endorsing political candidates who advanced policies he agreed with and opposing candidates with whom he disagreed. It is also quite apparent that he enjoys the “thrust and parry” of that discussion and that he places little stock in opposing views such as those espoused by Dr. Ball, which Dr. Weaver characterized as “odd” and “bizarre”. Dr. Weaver went so far as to post the Article on his “wall of hate” located outside his office, alongside other articles and correspondence from “climate doubters”. It is apparent that he views such material as more of a “badge of honour” than a legitimate challenge to his character or reputation.
[79] The issue of climate change is a matter of public interest and, as noted, Dr. Weaver has been at the forefront of public discussion. It has long been recognized that where someone enters the public arena, it is to be expected that his or her actions and words will be subject to robust scrutiny and criticism. For example, in Lund v. Black Press Group Ltd., 2009 BCSC 937 [Lund], Mr. Justice Bracken stated, at para. 123:
[123] It is important to any community that matters of public interest are debated freely and openly. Sometimes, in the heat of discussions over a controversial issue where strong personal differences exist, persons on one side or other of the debate make comments that offend. But the fact that they offend is not enough. The comments must go beyond strong criticisms of a public man acting in his capacity as a public official. …
[80] Similar observations were made by Chief Justice Nemetz in Vander Zalm, at 535 and 536. While the plaintiffs in both Lund and Vander Zalm were elected officials, in my view, the principle applies with equal force to others who actively engage in matters of public interest.
[81] In WIC Radio, Justice Lebel again, in his concurring reasons said, at paras. 74-75:
[74] Members of the public will generally have a more solid basis on which to evaluate a comment about a public figure than one about someone who is unknown. Thus, although public figures are certainly more open to criticism than those who avoid the public eye, this does not mean that their reputations are necessarily more vulnerable. In fact, public figures may have greater opportunity to influence their own reputations for the better.
[75] People who voluntarily take part in debates on matters of public interest must expect a reaction from the public. Indeed, public response will often be one of the goals of self‑expression. In the context of such debates (and at the risk of mixing metaphors), public figures are expected to have a thick skin and not to be too quick to cry foul when the discussion becomes heated. This is not to say that harm to one’s reputation is the necessary price of being a public figure. Rather, it means that what may harm a private individual’s reputation may not damage that of a figure about whom more is known and who may have had ample opportunity to express his or her own contrary views.
[82] The law of defamation provides an important tool for protecting an individual’s reputation from unjustified attack. However, it is not intended to stifle debate on matters of public interest nor to compensate for every perceived slight or to quash contrary view points, no matter how ill-conceived. Public debate on matters of importance is an essential element of a free and democratic society and lies at the heart of the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression. As Justice Lebel observes, such debate often includes critical and even offensive commentary, which is best met through engagement and well-reasoned rejoinder. It is only when the words used reach the level of genuinely threatening a person’s actual reputation that resort to the law of defamation is available. Such is not the case here.
[83] In summary, the Article is a poorly written opinion piece that offers Dr. Ball’s views on conventional climate science and Dr. Weaver’s role as a supporter and teacher of that science. While the Article is derogatory of Dr. Weaver, it is not defamatory, in that the impugned words do not genuinely threaten Dr. Weaver’s reputation in the minds of reasonably thoughtful and informed readers. Dr. Weaver has therefore failed to establish the first element of the defamation test.
[84] Given this finding, I need not consider whether Dr. Weaver has established that the Article was published in the sense that it was downloaded and read in BC by anyone other than him. I also need not address the defences raised by Dr. Ball.
Conclusion
[85] Dr. Weaver’s claim is dismissed. If the parties cannot agree on costs, they may make arrangements to speak to the issue.
“Skolrood J.”